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1355 
LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO STINGRAY USE: 
REGULATING CELL SITE SIMULATOR TECHNOLOGY 
POST-RILEY 
Ada Danelo
*
 
Abstract: In Riley v. California, the United States Supreme Court held that law 
enforcement must generally obtain a warrant before searching the contents of an individual’s 
cell phone. However, Riley did not address whether the warrant requirement extended to cell 
phone metadata, e.g. non-content information such as location information. This gap creates 
uncertainty as to whether law enforcement officers must obtain a warrant to use Cell Site 
Simulators, a portable technology that mimics a cell tower to get location information 
metadata from cell phones. Law enforcement has justified the warrantless gathering of cell 
site information under the third-party doctrine, which provides that there is no Fourth 
Amendment-protected privacy interest in information made available to a third party such as 
a phone service provider. Riley did not explicitly address the warrant requirement in the 
context of metadata. And until recently, post-Riley circuit courts were split on whether a 
warrant is required for metadata. A legislative resolution of this uncertainty is thus useful, 
both to safeguard individual privacy and to provide clear but not overly restrictive rules for 
law enforcement. This Note will address what legislative solutions states have pursued, and 
the benefits and shortcomings of each option. 
INTRODUCTION 
A cell site simulator, more commonly known as a StingRay, is a 
portable device that mimics a cell tower so that nearby cell phones will 
connect to it.
1
 A StingRay can obtain cell site location information 
(CSLI) without the cell phone user’s knowledge or consent.2 Law 
enforcement finds this information very useful, but media and citizens 
groups have criticized StingRays.
3
 One group argues that “[y]ou don’t 
have to be a criminal to be caught in this law enforcement snare. You 
                                                     
* With thanks to Professor Mary D. Fan for her excellent guidance, and to Peter Danelo, Bruno da 
Silva, and the admirable staff of Washington Law Review for their help in editing. 
1. Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, ‘StingRay’ Phone Tracker Fuels Constitutional Clash, WALL  
ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240531119041946045765831 
12723197574 [https://perma.cc/5BPH-2NE7]. 
2. Id. (“A stingray works by mimicking a cellphone tower, getting a phone to connect to it and 
measuring signals from the phone. It lets the stingray operator ‘ping,’ or send a signal to, a phone 
and locate it as long as it is powered on[.]”). 
3. Kate Martin, Tacoma Police Using Surveillance Device to Sweep up Cellphone Data, NEWS 
TRIB. (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/article25878184.html [https:// 
perma.cc/L28S]. 
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just have to be near one and use a cellphone.”4 This Note seeks an 
approach that strikes a balance between these safety and privacy 
concerns. 
StingRays raise conflicting interests between law enforcement and the 
communities they protect. They provide legitimate benefits to society by 
helping officers quickly find violent criminals and individuals in need, 
yet they present privacy concerns that officers will overstep their bounds 
and use StingRays for warrantless snooping into the lives of ordinary 
civilians. 
Law enforcement officers use StingRays to, among other purposes, 
locate crime suspects and assist search-and-rescue teams.
5
 One police 
department’s records indicate that the department used its StingRay 
nearly 100 times between 2011 and 2015.
6
 In seventy-six of those 
instances, the department obtained a judge’s approval to use the 
StingRay in searches for fugitives, murder suspects, or other violent 
criminals.
7
 In twenty-one cases, the department used the StingRay 
without a warrant under emergency circumstances: to find missing 
persons, kidnapping victims, or other people in peril.
8
 
Despite the technological advantages that StingRays present to law 
enforcement in their efforts to protect the public, privacy advocates are 
concerned that law enforcement uses these devices to track bystanders 
without a warrant.
9
 “They are essentially searching the homes of 
innocent Americans to find one phone used by one person,” according to 
Christopher Soghoian of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 
who characterizes the technology as akin to “kicking down the doors of 
50 homes and searching 50 homes because they don’t know where the 
bad guy is.”10 Soghoian describes StingRay technology as a high-tech 
game of “Marco Polo,” in which the StingRay sends a “Marco” signal, 
and all cellphones within range are indiscriminately compelled to 
                                                     
4. Id.  
5. Valentino-DeVries, supra note 1. (“The device has various uses, including helping police 
locate suspects and aiding search-and-rescue teams in finding people lost in remote areas or buried 
in rubble after an accident.”).  
6. Glenn E. Rice, Secret Cellphone Tracking Device Used by Police Stings Civil Libertarians, 
KAN. CITY STAR (Sept. 5, 2015, 3:24 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/news/business/technology/ 
article34185690.html [https://perma.cc/8V8G-4CK5]. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Martin, supra note 3. 
10. Id. 
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respond “Polo” without the owner’s knowledge that the cell phone 
passed data to government equipment instead of a cellphone tower.
11
 
While individual law enforcement organizations’ practices vary, 
many, such as the Department of Justice, maintain that they take 
precautions to limit their StingRay use.
12
 The United States Department 
of Justice deletes data no less than once daily, and does so as soon as the 
target cell phone is located.
13
 The Police Department of Tacoma, 
Washington, issued a press release stating that the department’s 
investigators “only use the device to locate suspects named in search 
warrants.”14 
This Note details potential state legislation to address law 
enforcement’s StingRay use. Part I explains StingRay technology. Part II 
provides background on the United States Supreme Court’s relevant 
Fourth Amendment precedent and describes how circuit courts have 
treated CSLI. Part III explains why United States Supreme Court action 
is unlikely in the near future and advocates for a legislative solution to 
the issue. Part IV explains state legislative solutions currently in use and 
other options available to state legislatures. 
I. THE RISE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT USE OF STINGRAY 
TECHNOLOGY 
Cell phones are widely used in the United States.
15
 As of January 
2014, ninety percent of American adults owned a cell phone.
16
 As of 
October 2014, sixty-four percent of American adults owned a 
smartphone.
17
 People use their cell phones to email, text, get directions, 
and even to share their location by “checking in” at physical sites.18 For 
a cell phone to provide many of these services, it must connect to a 
                                                     
11. Id.  
12. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Enhanced Policy for Use 
of Cell-Site Simulators (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-
announces-enhanced-policy-use-cell-site-simulators [https://perma.cc/7HFE-QSU8]. 
13. Id.  
14. Drew Mikkelsen, Tacoma, Wash., Police Use Cell-Phone Tracking Device, U.S.A. TODAY 
(Aug. 28, 2014, 4:59 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/08/28/cell-
phone-tracking-stingray/14751105/ [https://perma.cc/TQS3-CUKD].  
15. Mobile Technology Factsheet, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 27, 2013), http://www.pewinternet. 
org/fact-sheets/mobile-technology-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/HVJ5-P7YN]. 
16. Id. (rising to 97% and 98% for the 30–49 and 18–29 age groups). 
17. Id.  
18. Maeve Duggan, Cell Phone Activities 2013, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 19, 2013), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/09/19/cell-phone-activities-2013 [https://perma.cc/HJT2-2VVL]. 
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cellular network.
19
 Cell towers achieve this connection by transmitting 
the network’s data to a phone and simultaneously capturing the phone’s 
location.
20
 
Cell phones operate by connecting to cell towers, regularly updating 
their location to those towers, and then paging those towers to receive or 
transmit calls.
21
 To make calls, a cell phone must constantly relay its 
location to the nearest cell towers.
22
 The cell towers identify each phone 
by its assigned ten-digit phone number as well as by the phone’s 
unchangeable electronic serial number.
23
 Cell phones connect with cell 
towers approximately every seven seconds.
24
 When a cell phone pings 
surrounding cell towers, it connects to up to seven nearby towers.
25
 
Phones transmit these location signals on a separate frequency from the 
frequencies that relay cell phone calls and data.
26
 The cellular network 
uses these signals to locate a phone whenever it receives a call.
27
 
Unlike real-time tracking, historical CSLI refers to the location 
information from cell towers collected over time.
28
 Historical CSLI is 
“non-content” information: it does not include the content of any calls or 
data transmitted.
29
 Cellular networks retain historical CSLI for billing 
purposes.
30
 The amount of CSLI retained by a cellular network depends 
                                                     
19. See Cell Phone and Service Buying Guide, CONSUMER REP. (Mar. 2016), 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/cell-phones-services/buying-guide.htm?pn=2 
[https://perma.cc/XZ6E-C995].  
20. See Hearing on Electronic Communications Privacy Act Reform Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on Judiciary, 111th Cong. 5 (2010) 
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Prof. Orin Kerr).  
21. Heath Hardman, The Brave New World of Cell-Site Simulators, 8 ALB. GOVT. L. REV. 1, 12, 
14–16 (2015).  
22. See Transcript of Record at 7–8, United States v. Sims (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2007) (No. 06-674) 
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/celltracking/shutetestimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/97JA-D2JM] 
(testimony of William Shute). 
23. Note, Who Knows Where You’ve Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use of Cellular 
Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 309 (2004).  
24. Kevin McLaughlin, Note, Fourth Amendment and Cell Phone Location Tracking: Where Are 
We?, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 421, 426 (2007) (reviewing prospective CSLI 
jurisprudence). 
25. Transcript of Record, supra note 22, at 9 (testimony of William Shute). 
26. McLaughlin, supra note 24, at 426.  
27. Id.  
28. See Hearing, supra note 20, at 5.  
29. Id. at 6.  
30. Transcript of Record, supra note 22, at 10 (testimony of William Shute). 
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on that network’s policy, though most networks retain CSLI for over a 
year.
31
 
Law enforcement commonly requests historical or real-time CSLI 
from cellular providers for use in investigations.
32
 Officers can use this 
information to ascertain from where and with whom a suspect 
communicates.
33
 A cell phone’s proximity to a given cell tower, the 
signal strength, and the cell phone’s movement between towers reveal 
the phone’s location.34 
Courts have begun to address historical CSLI.
35
 The evidentiary 
standard that officers must show when requesting CSLI varies by 
jurisdiction and by type of CSLI.
36
 Depending on the jurisdiction, 
officers may obtain CSLI by requesting a subpoena, court order, or 
warrant.
37
 A subpoena, which commands the production of documents or 
a personal appearance before a court, requires no showing of suspicion.
38
 
A court order, on the other hand, requires reasonable suspicion that a 
suspect is involved in criminal activity.
39
 A warrant, the most protective 
standard, requires probable cause that a suspect has committed a crime 
or that a search will reveal evidence of a crime.
40
 
Jurisdictions differ in how they address CSLI, even before the added 
layer of complexity presented by StingRay use. A StingRay, as 
described earlier, is a portable device that pretends to be a cell tower so 
                                                     
31. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RETENTION PERIODS OF MAJOR CELLULAR SERVICE PROVIDERS 
(Aug. 2010), https://www.aclu.org/cell-phone-location-tracking-request-response-cell-phone-
company-data-retention-chart [https://perma.cc/PVN3-8VTC]. 
32. See Zachary Ross, Note, Bridging the Cellular Divide: A Search for Consensus Regarding 
Law Enforcement Access to Historical Cell Data, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1185, 1187 (2014).  
33. Scott A. Fraser, Comment, Making Sense of New Technologies and Old Law: A New 
Proposal for Historical Cell-Site Location Jurisprudence, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 571, 582 
(2012).  
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 574–76 (discussing the judiciary’s treatment of CSLI).  
36. Ross, supra note 32, at 1187. 
37. Id. at 1187, 1198–99. See also Part II.B.2.iii. 
38. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE USE OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA AUTHORITIES BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES AND ENTITIES, 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/rpt_to_congress.htm#2a1 [https://perma.cc/QB3K-WDPX] 
(“Administrative subpoena authorities allow executive branch agencies to issue a compulsory 
request for documents or testimony without prior approval from a grand jury, court, or other judicial 
entity.”); U.S. MARSHALS SERV., SERVICE OF PROCESS: CRIMINAL SUBPOENA, 
http://www.usmarshals.gov/process/subpoena.htm [https://perma.cc/2ZHX-UZ7E]. 
39. 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2012); Devallis Rutledge, Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion, 
POLICE MAGAZINE (June 7, 2011), http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/ articles/2011/ 
06/probable-cause-and-reasonable-suspicion.aspx [https://perma.cc/W4YZ-N3NY].  
40. Rutledge, supra note 40.  
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that it can measure a target phone’s signal strength from multiple 
locations to determine where that phone is located.
41
 In many cases, the 
government has first gathered historical CSLI to determine the general 
area of the target cell phone.
42
 After simulating a cell tower, StingRays 
page the target cell phone.
43
 They continue paging the target phone until 
they have sufficient readings to locate the phone.
44
 The Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) has used StingRays since at least 1995.
45
 More 
recently, local law enforcement agencies have begun to use StingRays.
46
 
Cell phone companies’ newfound resistance to CSLI requests has 
contributed to an increase in law enforcement’s use of StingRays.47 
Historically, law enforcement agencies could easily request CSLI from 
phone companies under the Stored Communications Act (SCA).
48
 But as 
concern has grown about maintaining digital privacy, phone companies 
have become more resistant to cooperating with law enforcement.
49
 The 
New York Times notes that “[w]ith the rapid expansion of cell 
surveillance have come rising concerns—including among carriers—
about what legal safeguards are in place to balance law enforcement 
agencies’ needs for quick data against the privacy rights of 
consumers.”50 Many companies now employ legal staff specifically to 
                                                     
41. EPIC v. FBI: StingRay/Cell Site Simulator, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., 
http://epic.org/foia/fbi/stingray/ [https://perma.cc/6WZ8-L557]. 
42. Id. 
43. Kim Zetter, Secrets of FBI Smartphone Surveillance Tool Revealed in Court Fight, WIRED 
MAG. (Apr. 9, 2013, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/04/verizon-rigmaiden-aircard/ 
[https://perma.cc/3B5U-L63W].  
44. Id. (describing how coordinates are overlaid to find a phone’s location). Although some cell-
site simulators are capable not only of tracking but also of listening to phone calls, this Note only 
addresses the location-specific StingRay technology. See Andy Greenberg, Despite FCC “Scare 
Tactics,” Researcher Demos AT&T Eavesdropping, FORBES (July 31, 2010, 5:35 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/firewall/2010/07/31/despite-fcc-scare-tactics-researcher-demos-att-
eavesdropping/ [https://perma.cc/HZ2V-4TRZ]. 
45. EPIC v. FBI: StingRay/Cell Site Simulator, supra note 41. 
46. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 3.  
47. See, e.g., Hope King, Tech Companies Standing up to Government Data Requests, CNN 
MONEY (June 18, 2015, 6:06 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/18/technology/data-protection-
government/ [https://perma.cc/JE3F-EB9J]; Ellen Nakashima, Apple Vows to Resist FBI Demand to 
Crack iPhone Linked to San Bernadino Attacks, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-wants-apple-to-help-unlock-iphone-
used-by-san-bernardino-shooter/2016/02/16/69b903ee-d4d9-11e5-9823-02b905009f99_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/BK69-GCWM].   
48. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2002), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2002). 
49. Eric Lichtblau, More Demands on Cell Carriers in Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/09/us/cell-carriers-see-uptick-in-requests-to-aid-surveillance.html 
[https://perma.cc/4XEY-SZXH]. 
50. Id.  
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respond to law enforcement records requests, perhaps in response to 
public perception that these companies are overly compliant with the 
government.
51
 Companies including AT&T and T-Mobile require a 
warrant before they will allow law enforcement access to a user’s 
current location data, while others, including Verizon and Cricket, say 
they cannot provide current location data at all.
52
 
StingRays bypass the need to request real-time CSLI from a cellular 
provider by enabling law enforcement to track a cell phone 
independently.
53
 StingRays are a major technological improvement for 
law enforcement over historical CSLI. However, they raise privacy 
concerns because they enable law enforcement to bypass a third party, 
the phone company, to obtain CSLI. According to the ACLU, the 
prevalence of StingRays is worrisome; as of early 2016, they were used 
by at least fifty-seven agencies in twenty-two states.
54
 Until now, 
legislatures and courts have failed to adequately address CSLI’s effect 
on the competing values of efficient law enforcement and individual 
privacy. 
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND TECHNOLOGY-AIDED 
INVESTIGATION 
The Fourth Amendment provides that the 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.
55
 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Fourth 
Amendment protects only an expectation of privacy that is “reasonable” 
                                                     
51. See Brian X. Chen, A Senator Plans Legislation to Narrow Authorities’ Cellphone Data 
Requests, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/09/technology/a- 
senator-plans-legislation-to-narrow-authorities-cellphone-data-requests.html [https://perma.cc/SD 
G5-8WMK].  
52. Id.  
53. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.  
54. American Civil Liberties Union, Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?, 
https://www.aclu.org/map/StingRay-tracking-devices-whos-got-them [https://perma.cc/6RMP-
6VWK].  
55. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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or “legitimate.”56 Once a court has determined that a search occurred, the 
question becomes whether that search was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, and whether a warrant was necessary.
57
 The Fourth 
Amendment itself does not define “reasonable,” but courts, including the 
United States Supreme Court, have defined its limitations by providing 
many exceptions to the warrant requirement.
58
 In fact, “[t]he vast 
majority of searches conducted by government agents are lawful despite 
the absence of a warrant; a substantial number of these are lawful despite 
the lack of probable cause.”59 
The Court has acknowledged that its own reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy standard may be “subjective and unpredictable.”60 The standard 
is particularly unpredictable when applied to electronic surveillance, 
which presents fact patterns that are hard to analogize to past cases.
61
 
Indeed, the Court has tried to keep up with emerging technology for 
nearly five decades using the Katz v. United States
62
 reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test—from infrared imaging in Kyllo v. United 
States,
63
 to GPS tracking in United States v. Jones,
64
 and now 
smartphones in Riley v. California.
65
 
The Fourth Amendment requires a warrant based on probable cause to 
search homes and other private premises or to intercept 
                                                     
56. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (holding that a phone company’s use of a 
pen register to provide police with a record of phone numbers that a suspect dialed from his landline 
was not a Fourth Amendment search); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (“there is a 
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy 
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).  
57. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
58. Clifford S. Fishman, Searching Cell Phones After Arrest: Exceptions to the Warrant and 
Probable Cause Requirements, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 995, 999–1000 (2013).  
59. Id. at 1001.  
60. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (holding that a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy against the government’s use of surveillance to learn about the inside of that 
person’s home, particularly when the technology used is not available to the general public—thus 
the government’s use of thermal imaging technology to measure the heat emanating from 
defendant’s home was a search).  
61. See 1 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING: SURVEILLANCE IN THE 
INTERNET AGE §§ 1:3–1:6 (3d ed. 2007).  
62. See generally 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
63. See generally 533 U.S. 27 (2001).  
64. See generally 565 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).  
65. See generally 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); see also Robinson Meyer, Do Police Need 
a Warrant to See Where a Phone Is?, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/tech078nology/archive/2015/08/warrantless-cell-phone-location-
tracking/400775/ [https://perma.cc/6KMA-5L7C]. 
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communications.
66
 A warrant is not required under the following 
exceptions, when: (1) a search occurs incident to a lawful arrest; (2) an 
object is in plain view; (3) the suspect gives consent to the search; (4) an 
officer is engaged in a “stop and frisk” rather than a full search; (5) an 
officer has probable cause to believe that an automobile contains 
evidence of a crime; or (6) exigent circumstances exist (such as 
emergencies or hot pursuit of a criminal).
67
 The most commonly used 
exceptions to the warrant requirement are exigent circumstances based 
on imminent risk of physical danger or destruction of evidence, and the 
search of a person incident to arrest.
68
 Of special relevance to cell phone 
searches is the plain view exception, which provides that information in 
plain view, such as the photo on a cell phone’s screensaver, is not a 
search.
69
 Under the plain view doctrine, police may answer a suspect’s 
cell phone or respond to incoming text messages immediately following 
arrest if officers have probable cause to believe that the phone was used 
in connection with the crime.
70
 The exceptions to the warrant 
requirement serve to balance efficiency and public safety with personal 
privacy. 
A. Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and the Third Party Exposure 
Doctrine 
As described more thoroughly in Section III below, Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence is unclear as to whether a warrant is required 
                                                     
66. Fishman, supra note 58, at 1001–02; see also THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 217-82 (2008) (discussing arrests and seizures, 
only a small fraction of which require a warrant).  
67. See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 452 (2011) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 
385, 394 (1978)) (holding that no warrant is required for exigent circumstances); Horton v. 
California, 496 U.S. 128, 141 (1990) (holding that officers can seize objects in plain view without a 
search warrant); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823–24 (1982) (holding that no warrant is 
required if the officer has probable cause that the automobile contains evidence of a crime), 
overruled by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 332 (2009) (concluding that once a driver has been 
removed from a car and arrested, there is no longer any possibility that the driver could seize 
anything in the vehicle and destroy it or use it as a weapon, and thus there is no justification for a 
warrantless search of the car); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973) (holding that 
consent-based searches are constitutionally acceptable); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 759 
(1969) (quoting Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 708 (1948)) (establishing the search 
incident to arrest exception); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that officers can stop 
and frisk if there is reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is dangerous).  
68. Fishman, supra note 58, at 1002–03.  
69. Id. at 1002.  
70. 1 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING: SURVEILLANCE IN THE 
INTERNET AGE § 5:177 (3d ed. 2007). 
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for CSLI. However, the third-party doctrine may wholly exempt CSLI 
from Fourth Amendment protections.
71
 The third-party doctrine provides 
that information voluntarily conveyed to a third party receives no Fourth 
Amendment protection.
72
 Thus, the government can seize without a 
warrant any information that an individual has willingly shared with a 
third party.
73
 
Under the third-party doctrine, when someone voluntarily conveys 
information to another entity, such as a bank or a telephone company, 
that person assumes the risk that the third party could disclose that 
information to the government.
74
 In United States v. Miller,
75
 the Court 
found that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the documents he provided to his bank.
76
 The government 
could thus obtain those documents from the bank without a warrant, 
even though the defendant may have assumed that the bank would only 
use them for a limited purpose.
77
 
There is also no reasonable expectation of privacy in phone numbers 
that an individual dials. In Smith v. Maryland,
78
 the United States 
Supreme Court found that the defendant had no expectation of privacy in 
phone numbers that he called, since he voluntarily conveyed those same 
numbers to the telephone company, a third party.
79
 The Court noted that 
the disclosure statement at the front of a phone book alerts phone users 
to their lack of privacy expectations when dialing a phone number.
80
 The 
Court thus held that the installation of pen registers on the defendant’s 
phone line was not a Fourth Amendment search.
81
 A pen register is an 
electronic device that records the numbers dialed from a particular phone 
                                                     
71. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 355 (4th Cir. 2015), rev’d en banc United 
States v. Graham, 2016, Nos. 12-4659, 12-4825, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797, at *19–20 (4th Cir. 
May 31, 2016) (holding that police did not need a warrant to obtain over 200 days worth of CSLI, as 
they could instead rely on the third-party doctrine).  
72. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that government’s use of a pen register 
to record the phone numbers dialed from defendant’s phone line was not a search). 
73. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 735; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
74. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 735; Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.  
75. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
76. Id. at 443. 
77. Id. 
78. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
79. Id. at 744.  
80. Id. at 742–43. (“Most phone books tell subscribers, on a page entitled ‘Consumer 
Information,’ that the company ‘can frequently help in identifying to the authorities the origin of 
unwelcome and troublesome calls.’”) 
81. Id. at 746.  
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line.
82
 Unlike in Katz, where the Court held that the government 
eavesdropping on defendant’s phone calls was a search requiring a 
warrant,
83
 the pen registers in Smith did not capture the contents of 
defendant’s phone calls.84 Furthermore, “[a]ll telephone users realize 
that they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone 
company . . . .”85 Because a telephone user is aware that the phone 
company monitors the numbers dialed to connect a call, under the Katz 
test that person has no legitimate expectation of privacy.
86
 Courts have 
applied the third-party doctrine to the address on the outside of an 
envelope,
87
 and even to the interception of a telephone conversation by a 
portable radio.
88
 
Although the United States Supreme Court has not addressed CSLI, 
all Circuit Courts of Appeals to rule on the issue have held that cell 
phone users have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their CSLI.
89
 
Because CSLI is information shared with a third party (the cellular 
provider), users assume the risk of its disclosure.
90
 As in Smith, the 
lower courts found that a defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
is negated by the average person’s knowledge of how phones work and 
the fact that they expose location information to third parties.
91
 
In Smith, the United States Supreme Court found several ways in 
which a telephone subscriber objectively receives notice that the phone 
company is documenting the subscriber’s dialing activity.92 By dialing, 
the user realizes those digits are conveyed to the phone company to 
complete the call; by reviewing the itemized bill, the user realizes that 
the digits dialed are recorded; and by using a telephone book, the 
                                                     
82. Id. at 741–42.  
83. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–53 (1967).  
84. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.  
85. Id. at 742.  
86. Id.  
87. United States v. Huie, 593 F.2d 14, 15 (5th Cir. 1979). 
88. Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705, 706–07 (8th Cir. 1989) (discussing situation in which officers 
intercepted a conversation on a portable phone using a radio).  
89. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 883 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. 
Graham, Nos. 12-4659, 12-4825, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797, at *13 (4th Cir. May 31, 2016) 
(holding that 200 days’ worth of CSLI was available under the third-party doctrine, and thus no 
warrant was required); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 500 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding the same 
for 67 days’ worth of CSLI); In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 
615 (5th Cir. 2013). Note that some circuits have not reached this conclusion until en banc review.  
90. Davis, 785 F.3d at 510.  
91. See, e.g., id. (discussing Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 613).  
92. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–43 (1979). 
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consumer is put on notice that telephone companies monitor dialing 
activity.
93
 Thus, even if an individual subjectively believed that dialed 
digits were private, that belief would be unreasonable, and under the 
Katz test, not protected by the Fourth Amendment.
94
 
By the same logic, users should be aware that a phone company 
tracks their location—for example, to impose surcharges for roaming, to 
provide directions, or to locate lost or stolen phones. Even if an 
individual cell phone user purports not to know that she is tracked, and 
thus claims a subjective expectation of privacy, the broad public 
awareness of cell phone tracking indicates that there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy. According to the Department of Justice, “‘a 
customer’s Fourth Amendment rights are not violated when [a] phone 
company reveals to the government its own records that show where a 
mobile device placed and received calls.”95 
It is unclear whether the third-party doctrine applies to StingRays.
96
 
While cell phone users might know that their phones automatically 
transmit a signal, they likely do not know that the government can use a 
StingRay to capture that signal without their consent or action.
97
 Since a 
phone user makes no voluntary transmission to a third party under this 
analysis, the third-party doctrine would not apply.
98
 
Furthermore, the third-party doctrine itself has come under substantial 
criticism—some scholars believe it is outdated in light of modern 
technology, and believe that although lower courts are still following the 
doctrine, the United States Supreme Court is likely to revisit it.
99
 The 
                                                     
93. Id.  
94. Id. at 743–44.  
95. Declan McCullagh, Court Allows Warrantless Cell Location Tracking, CNET NEWS (Sept. 7, 
2010, 1:44 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/court-allows-warrantless-cell-location-tracking/ 
[https://perma.cc/3SNM-BPD8].  
96. See Hardman, supra note 21, at 21.  
97. See id.  
98. See id. at 22.  
99. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 561 
(2009) (defending “the controversial rule that information loses Fourth Amendment protection when 
it is knowingly revealed to a third party.”); Hanni Fakhoury, Smith v. Maryland Turns 35, but Its 
Health Is Declining, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (June 24, 2014), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/06/smith-v-maryland-turns-35-its-healths-declining 
[https://perma.cc/DKF7-XD9H]; Jenna McLaughlin, Appeals Court Delivers Devastating Blow to 
Cellphone-Privacy Advocates, THE INTERCEPT (May 31, 2016, 12:58 PM), 
https://theintercept.com/2016/05/31/appeals-court-delivers-devastating-blow-to-cell-phone-privacy-
advocates/ [https://perma.cc/4ELP-GC27]. 
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Fourth Circuit recently noted that the “Supreme Court may in the future 
limit, or even eliminate, the third-party doctrine.”100 
B. The Courts Grapple with Technology and the Fourth Amendment 
1. Early United States Supreme Court Cases 
There is little United States Supreme Court precedent on cell phones 
or on tracking technology, and none indicates how the court would rule 
on CSLI.
101
 The cases relevant to the use of CSLI date back to the 
1970s, far before a majority of Americans owned a cell phone.
102
 In Katz 
v. United States, the Court established the contemporary framework for 
Fourth Amendment analysis, requiring both a subjective and an 
objective expectation of privacy.
103
 In United States v. Knotts,
104
 the 
Court held that people have no reasonable expectation of privacy on 
public roadways.
105
 In United States v. Karo,
106
 the Court restricted 
Knotts and held that using technology to monitor inside a private 
residence, not open to visual surveillance, is a search.
107
 Recently, the 
Court addressed the use of a GPS device in United States v. Jones,
108
 
holding that a warrant was required to place a GPS device on a 
defendant’s car because placement of the GPS device was a trespass to 
chattels.
109
 And in Riley v. California,
110
 the Court required a warrant for 
any search of the contents of a cell phone.
111
 But the Court has yet to 
address cell phone metadata or location information. 
                                                     
100. United States v. Graham, Nos. 12-4659, 12-4825, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797, at *5 (4th 
Cir. May 31, 2016). 
101. Some of the only examples will be discussed further below: United States v. Jones, 
__ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) and Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).  
102. Cell phones were invented in 1973 and weighed 1.1 kilos. Richard Goodwin, The History of 
Cell Phones from 1973 to 2008: The Handsets that Made It All Happen, KNOW YOUR MOBILE 
(Apr. 16, 2015, 2:15 PM), http://www.knowyourmobile.com/nokia/nokia-3310/19848/history-
mobile-phones-1973-2008-handsets-made-it-all-happen [https://perma.cc/S7MW-UADE].  
103. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
104. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
105. See id. at 281–82.   
106. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
107. See id. at 713–16.  
108. 565 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
109.  See id. at 949–51. 
110. __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
111. See id. at 2495.  
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In Katz v. United States, the United States Supreme Court provided a 
test to determine whether a search requiring a warrant has taken place.
112
 
Justice Harlan’s concurrence set forth what has become the traditional 
two-prong test.
113
 The first prong is whether a person has shown “an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,” and the second is whether 
that expectation is “one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”114 Katz thus expanded Fourth Amendment protections 
from a given place—the home—to other aspects of an individual’s life. 
Furthermore, Katz reduced Fourth Amendment protection of the home, 
holding that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in 
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.”115 
Technology-aided surveillance of people in public places is not a 
Fourth Amendment search.
116
 In United States v. Knotts, the Court found 
that police use of a radio transmitter to track the movement of a 
defendant’s car on public roads was not a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment because “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public 
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements from one place to another.”117 
However, the Court limited Knotts to its facts in United States v. 
Karo, where law enforcement used a radio transmitter to track 
defendant’s movement inside a private home.118 The Court distinguished 
this from the actions of the agents in Knotts, who stopped tracking when 
the transmitter reached its destination.
119
 The Court limited the 
government to information that could be obtained “by observation from 
                                                     
112. 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (holding that the government’s 
recording of conversations in a public telephone booth merited Fourth Amendment protection). See 
also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739–40 (1979).  
113. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.  
114. Id. 
115. See id. at 351 (citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966); United States v. Lee, 
274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)).   
116. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983) (“Nothing in the Fourth 
Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at 
birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them.”). 
117. See id. at 281. Thus, a beeper that agents placed in a container of chemicals and used to track 
the suspect was acceptable. See id. at 277, 285.  
118. 468 U.S. 705, 708–10, 713–15 (1984).  
119. See id. at 714–15.  
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outside the curtilage of the house.”120 The use of a radio transmitter, 
then, requires a warrant only when it implicates private areas.
121
 
In Kyllo v. United States, the Court found that the use of sense-
enhancing technology “not in general public use” was a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.
122
 The sense-enhancing technology in question in 
Kyllo was heat imaging, which allowed police to see that a wall of 
Kyllo’s home was emitting abnormally high amounts of heat, indicating 
a marijuana grow operation.
123
 Like heat imaging, a StingRay could also 
be considered sense-enhancing technology: while heat imaging obviates 
the need for police to use more labor-intensive methods of detecting 
heat, StingRays reduce the need for physically tailing suspects. But the 
speed at which technology advances and becomes widely available casts 
doubt on the scope of society’s actual expectations of privacy. For 
example, the heat-imager at question in Kyllo can now be inexpensively 
obtained online by the general public, which fulfills the Court’s “in 
general public use” dicta.124 
This line of cases demonstrates that the United States Supreme Court 
precedent has not kept pace with rapidly evolving modern technology. 
Knotts and Karo established a distinction between public and private 
places; Kyllo only applies as long as the technology is not widely 
available for public purchase; and Katz is difficult to reconcile with a 
quickly changing concept of privacy. 
2. The Judicial Shift 
a. United States v. Jones: the Trespass to Chattels Theory 
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions have broached issues 
of technology and their effects on privacy. The Court makes clear that 
“[a]t bottom, [the Court] must ‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of 
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment 
was adopted.’”125 Drawing an analogy to now-ancient technology, in 
                                                     
120. See id. at 715. 
121. See id.; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281, 284.  
122. 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).   
123. See id. at 29–30.   
124. The Flir One, among many products of its kind available, costs $249.99 as of the editing of 
this Note, attaches to a smartphone, and is widely available online. See, e.g., FLIR, 
http://www.flir.com/flirone/display/?id=69324 [https://perma.cc/B9NN-CM84].  
125. United States v. Jones, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 
34).  
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United States v. Jones
126
 the Court found that a GPS device placed in a 
vehicle was akin to an eighteenth-century constable hiding in a horse-
drawn carriage.
127
 Both are unlawful trespasses to property, and thus 
unlawful searches.
128
 But Jones departed from the Katz reasonable 
expectation of privacy test that the Court used exclusively for decades, 
instead deciding the GPS issue on a trespass-to-chattels theory.
129
 This 
allowed the Court to sidestep addressing whether a warrant is required 
for GPS tracking outside of a suspect’s home: we only know that a 
warrant is required if the GPS device interferes with a suspect’s property 
rights.
130
 
Because Jones was decided on a trespass-to-chattels theory outside of 
the Fourth Amendment framework established by the Court in Katz, its 
holding is unhelpful when analyzing whether a warrant is required for 
CSLI. Although the Court previously found that use of technology 
widely available to the public may not be a search requiring a warrant,
131
 
it sidestepped that question entirely in Jones.
132
 
The lower court in Jones established the mosaic theory, which is 
popular among those who believe a full warrant should be required for 
CSLI tracking.
133
 Under the mosaic theory, even if a particular act of 
surveillance would be permissible under the Fourth Amendment, it may 
violate a suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy when used long-
term, since the aggregate information allows the government to infer 
intimate details about a suspect’s life.134 Under this theory, the D.C. 
Circuit found that a month of warrantless GPS surveillance violated the 
suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights.135 And after Jones, lower courts 
                                                     
126. __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
127. See id. at 951 n.3.  
128. See id. 
129. See id. at 949–51. Jones additionally distinguished itself from Knotts on two grounds. First, 
Knotts did not claim any physical trespass, whereas Jones did. See id. at 951–52. Second, the Jones 
Court stated that the Katz test is not exclusive, and therefore, even if a technique does not constitute 
a search under Katz, it might still qualify under the trespass test. See id. at 952–55.  
130. See id. at 953–54. From Kyllo, we know that tracking movements through GPS is a search if 
it shows details inside the home. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
131. Thus, if the general public had a certain device that permitted intrusion into a person’s 
private space, no warrant would be required for law enforcement’s use of that device.  
132. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957–64 (Alito, J., concurring).  
133. See generally, Gabriel R. Schlabach, Note, Privacy in the Cloud: The Mosaic Theory and 
the Stored Communications Act, 67 STAN. L. REV. 677 (2015). 
134. Id. at 678–79.  
135. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010); cf. Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 
1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that intelligence agencies should be not required to disclose 
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have held that prolonged warrantless searches violate the Fourth 
Amendment.
136
 But the United States Supreme Court has not adopted the 
mosaic theory—the closest the Court came to acknowledging the theory 
was in the Jones concurrences.
137
 Justice Sotomayor noted that long-
term GPS monitoring can create a “precise, comprehensive record” of a 
person’s movements that reveals a “wealth of detail” about that 
individual, and should require a full warrant.
138
 Justice Alito, joined by 
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, noted that the issue the Court 
should have addressed was the duration of the tracking, echoing Justice 
Sotomayor’s concerns.139 
Lower courts have failed to adopt a consistent rationale for Jones’ 
application to CSLI. United States v. Sereme
140
 denied a motion to 
suppress CSLI under the SCA post-Jones, holding that without the 
physical intrusion present in Jones, there was no unlawful search: “the 
Jones opinion does nothing to preclude the Government’s monitoring of 
individuals through the use of cell site technology.”141 United States v. 
Graham
142
 did the same, categorizing CSLI as voluntary “business 
records . . . created and maintained by the cellular providers.”143 Graham 
required only a reasonable suspicion standard of “specific and 
articulable facts” for CSLI.144 United States v. Skinner145 saw CSLI as an 
essential investigative tool too valuable to law enforcement to limit with 
a warrant requirement.
146
 The Skinner court also found “no inherent 
constitutional difference between trailing a defendant and tracking him 
                                                     
“seemingly innocuous information” since those “bits and pieces” can be added together to reveal 
“how the unseen whole must operate”).  
136. See, e.g., the panel opinions in Davis and Graham, both of which followed the Mosaic 
theory. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 
1205 (11th Cir. 2014).  
137. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954–57 (J. Sotomayor, concurring); id. at 957–59 (J. Alito, 
concurring).  
138. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (J. Sotomayor, concurring); see also Schlabach, supra note 133, at 
679. 
139. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957–58 (J. Alito, concurring). 
140. No. 2:11-CR-97-FtM-29SPC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68202 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2012). 
141. Id. at *29–30.  
142. 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Md. 2012), aff’d. by United States v. Graham, 2016 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 9797 (4th Cir. May 31, 2016). 
143. Id. at 398. The court noted, however, that CSLI, unlike business records which are 
“voluntary commercial transactions,” records “transmissions of radio signals in which the cell 
phone service subscriber may or may not be an active and voluntary participant.” Id. at 35657.  
144. See id. at 386–87. 
145. 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012). 
146. See id. at 774.  
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via [CSLI].”147 The Fifth Circuit characterized CSLI as a “record[] of 
transactions to which [the cell phone provider] is a party.” Thus, no 
warrant is required, provided that the government does not obtain 
communication content.
148
 The Fifth Circuit distinguished Jones and 
Karo from CSLI cases by asking who collected the location 
information.
149
 In Jones and Karo, the government collected location 
information, while the service provider collected CSLI.
150
 These cases 
illustrate that while Jones could be interpreted to limit the government’s 
power to track individuals, different courts interpret Jones differently 
when determining the standard required for CSLI. 
Although Jones indicates the Court’s awareness of tracking devices, it 
provides no clear standard that courts can apply to later tracking cases. 
While both GPS and CSLI provide a person’s location, a suspect being 
“tracked surreptitiously with a GPS device has no knowledge” of the 
location recording, whereas a cell phone user knows that in order to use 
the phone, that phone must be connected to the cellular network.
151
 
Additionally, because Jones was decided based on a trespass theory 
instead of under the Katz test, its logical extension to CSLI, which does 
not involve physical trespass, is weakened.
152
 
b. Riley v. California: Warrant Requirement for Cell Phone Contents 
When police search the contents of a suspect’s phone, even one seized 
incident to arrest, they conduct a Fourth Amendment search.
153
 Chief 
Justice Roberts stated Riley’s holding bluntly: “[o]ur answer to the 
question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized 
incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”154 
In Riley v. California, the Court unanimously held that police could 
not conduct a warrantless search of the contents of a cell phone seized 
incident to arrest absent exigent circumstances.
155
 The key issue in Riley 
                                                     
147. Id. at 778.  
148. In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 612 (5th 
Cir. 2013).  
149. See id. at 609.  
150. Id. at 60910. Note that this analysis does not apply to StingRays, which are devices the 
government uses to collect location information. 
151. Elizabeth Elliott, Comment, United States v. Jones: The (Hopefully Temporary) Derailment 
of Cell-Site Location Information Protection, 15 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 1, 8 (2013).  
152. See id. at 9; United States v. Jones, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012). 
153. Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014). 
154. Id. at 2495.  
155. Id. at 2493–95.  
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was whether the search-incident-to-arrest exception, which permits 
police to seize and search anything found in an arrestee’s possession, 
extended to files stored on a cell phone.
156
 Riley found that it did not, 
stating that cell phones are in effect digital containers with “immense 
storage capacity” for private data,157 and accordingly “implicate privacy 
concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a 
wallet or a purse.”158 
The Riley Court considered two cases presenting a “common 
question.”159 In the first, the police arrested David Riley after 
discovering firearms hidden under the hood of his car.
160
 Upon searching 
Riley incident to arrest, the police found evidence that Riley was 
associated with a gang.
161
 The police then seized and searched Riley’s 
cell phone without a warrant, finding further evidence of Riley’s gang 
affiliation.
162
 The trial court judge found that the search of the cell phone 
was admissible because it was conducted incident to arrest.
163
 Based in 
part on the evidence from Riley’s cell phone, he was convicted of 
attempted murder, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and shooting at 
an occupied vehicle.
164
 
In the second case, Brima Wurie was arrested shortly after dealing 
drugs outside a convenience store.
165
 Officers took Wurie’s cell phone 
and observed several missed calls from “my house.”166 Without a 
warrant, officers flipped open the phone, noted the caller’s number, and 
tracked that number back to Wurie’s home.167 After obtaining a search 
warrant for the home, officers found large quantities of drugs, a gun, and 
cash.
168
 The district court found that the cell phone search was 
constitutional, since it occurred incident to arrest.
169
 Wurie was charged 
with, and subsequently convicted of, felony possession of a firearm and 
                                                     
156. See generally Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473.  
157. Id. at 2489. 
158. Id. at 2488–89.  
159. Id. at 2480.  
160. People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013). 
161. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480. 
162. Id.  
163. Riley, 2013 WL 475242, at *3. 
164. Id. at *1.  
165. United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 104, 106 (D. Mass. 2009). 
166. Id.  
167. Id. at 106–07.  
168. Id. at 107.  
169. Id. at 109–11.  
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ammunition, distribution of crack cocaine, and possession of crack 
cocaine with intent to distribute.
170
 In both cases, the convictions were 
overturned.
171
 
One of the most significant principles from the Court’s decision in 
Riley is that “digital is different, and the difference matters.”172 Chief 
Justice Roberts discussed privacy interests, positing that cell phones may 
provide “detailed information about all aspects of a person’s life.”173 The 
type and quantity of information on a phone can present a significant 
privacy intrusion.
174
 Phones are like “minicomputers” with telephone 
capability, collecting various details about a person’s life that may tell 
“more in combination than any single record.”175 “Cell phones differ in 
both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might 
be kept on an arrestee’s person.”176 For the above reasons, searching cell 
phone data is “materially indistinguishable” from a physical search.177 
Like Jones, Riley was a “rather unusual excursus” in the Court’s 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
178
 The Riley decision may have 
turned on “the justices’ own sense of what is intuitively private.”179 The 
Court provided an “indeterminate reasonableness test” which barely 
figures in search-incident-to-arrest precedent.
180
 Indeed, “in case after 
case, the Roberts Court has liquidated bright-line rules about when a 
search is unreasonable” in favor of reasonableness balancing.181 This 
marks the Court’s turn towards “reasonableness” as the “dominant mode 
of [Fourth Amendment] constitutional inquiry.”182 
                                                     
170. Id. at 105; Riley v. California, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014). 
171. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495.  
172. Brianne J. Gorod, Agreement at the Supreme Court: The Three Important Principles 
Underlying Riley v. California, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 70, 75 (2015).  
173. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490.  
174. Id. at 2489–91.  
175. Charles D. Weisselberg, Cell Phones and Everything Else: Criminal Law Cases in the 
Supreme Court’s 2013–2014 Term, 50 CT. REV. 164, 164–65 (2014). 
176. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489. 
177. Id. at 2488.  
178. See Noah Feldman, Justices Don’t Want their Smartphones Searched, BLOOMBERG VIEW 
(June 25, 2014, 11:24 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2014-06-25/justices-don-t-
want-their-smartphones-searched [https://perma.cc/P397-9C73?type=image]. 
179. Id.  
180. Fourth Amendment—Search and Seizure—Searching Cell Phones Incident to Arrest—Riley 
v. California, 128 HARV. L. REV. 251, 255–56 (2014) [hereinafter Fourth Amendment—Search and 
Seizure].  
181. Id. at 257.  
182. Id.; see Maryland v. King, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (holding the government may 
reasonably collect arrestees’ DNA without a warrant or individualized suspicion); Florence v. Bd. of 
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The Riley Court, eager to find a middle ground but unable to do so, 
settled for the clarity of requiring a warrant.
183
 The Justices’ desire for a 
moderate approach is reflected by the Court’s “handwringing about the 
lack of limiting principles” as well as the Justices’ repeated demands for 
an in-between rule during oral arguments.
184
 In their separate opinions, 
Justices Roberts and Alito emphasized that courts should construe Riley 
narrowly, and Justice Alito noted that he did not see a “workable 
alternative” to the majority’s rule.185 Thus, in one reading, Riley may 
indicate that the Court is adapting to the times and will not blindly apply 
law from an earlier age to today’s digital media.186 By another reading, 
although Riley itself was a victory for privacy advocates, the Court is 
unlikely to be as solicitous about defendants’ rights in future cases 
relying on the reasonableness approach, because the facts in Riley were 
particularly favorable to the defendants.
187
 Lacking a more moderate 
solution, the Riley court favored clarity because bright-line rules are 
particularly valuable for law enforcement: per Alito’s concurrence, 
“[l]aw enforcement officers need clear rules regarding searches incident 
to arrest.”188 
Riley’s reasoning clears the way for even more doctrinal change. 
“[L]ower courts are on notice” that they should not readily “follow 
broad statements from pre-digital opinions, even if those opinions 
emanated from the Supreme Court itself.”189 In his concurrence in Riley, 
Justice Alito noted that “we should not mechanically apply the rule used 
in the predigital era to the search of a cell phone” and that modern 
                                                     
Chosen Freeholders, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1520–23 (2012) (finding that an extensive strip 
search of all new detainees regardless of the severity of their infractions was reasonable).  
183. Fourth Amendment—Search and Seizure, supra note 180, at 259. 
184. Id. at 259–60; see also S.M., There’s No App for That, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 30, 2014, 2:01 
PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/04/mobile-phone-privacy [https: 
//perma.cc/X7LK-GS8F]. In oral arguments, the Justices repeatedly demanded an “in-between 
rule.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) 
(No. 13-132) (Breyer, J.), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/13-
132_h315.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4W9-XZ84] (citing Fourth Amendment—Search and Seizure, 
supra note 180).  
185. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2497 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
186. Michael D. Ricciuti & Kathleen D. Parker, My Phone Is My Castle: Supreme Court Decides 
That Cell Phones Seized Incident to Arrest Cannot Be Subject to Routine Warrantless Searches, 58 
B.B.J. 7, 9 (2014). 
187. Fourth Amendment—Search and Seizure, supra note 180, at 260.  
188. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2497 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
189. Richard Re, Symposium: Inaugurating the Digital Fourth Amendment, SCOTUS BLOG (June 
26, 2014, 12:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-inaugurating-the-digital-
fourth-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/GV3D-9PA6?type=image].  
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technology “calls for a new balancing of law enforcement and privacy 
interests.”190 
In this vein, the Court rejected the government’s reliance on the third-
party doctrine’s seminal case, Smith v. Maryland.191 Whereas in Smith, 
no Fourth Amendment search occurred, here the Court found there was a 
physical search.
192
 The Court additionally refused to permit searches of 
cell phone data even if law enforcement could have obtained the same 
information from a pre-digital counterpart, such as a personal journal, 
found during a search incident to arrest.
193
 The third-party doctrine is 
decades old, and in the light of changing technology, the Court may 
overrule or substantially modify it.
194
 Yet to date, the third-party 
doctrine stands.
195
 In fact, it is the authority under which law 
enforcement is gaining access to CSLI.
196
 
Riley has not produced clarity in the circuit courts on the question of 
whether a warrant is required to obtain CSLI.
197
 Until recently, there was 
a circuit split, with the Fourth Circuit holding that a warrant was 
required and the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits holding that no 
warrant was necessary, as CSLI is information shared with a third 
party.
198
 Indeed, “CSLI does not comfortably fit into any Fourth 
Amendment line of cases: it is difficult to simply label the data ‘records’ 
under the assumption of risk doctrine, or to call a cell phone just a 
tracking device under Knotts or Karo.”199 Riley “did not address whether 
                                                     
190. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2496–97 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
191. Id. at 2492–93. 
192. Id. (comparing Wurie’s case with the facts in Smith and finding that while Smith “concluded 
that the use of a pen register was not a ‘search’ at all under the Fourth Amendment . . . . There is no 
dispute here that the officers engaged in a search of Wurie’s cell phone.”) (citations omitted).  
193. Id.   
194. Jeremy H. Rothstein, Note, Track Me Maybe: The Fourth Amendment and the Use of Cell 
Phone Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 506 (2012).  
195. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015), rev’d en banc United 
States v. Graham, Nos. 12-4659, 12-4825, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797, *4 (4th Cir. May 31, 2016) 
(holding that the government’s acquisition of historical CSLI from defendants’ cell phone provider 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment).  
196. Id.  
197. Cf. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 500 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that a court order 
compelling the production of a third-party telephone company’s business records containing CSLI 
did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights); Graham, 796 F.3d at 338 (holding that 
the government’s warrantless procurement of CSLI was an unreasonable search in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment). 
198. C.f. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 883 (6th Cir. 2016); Davis, 785 F.3d at 500; 
Graham, 796 F.3d at 338; In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 
(5th Cir. 2013).  
199. Elliott, supra note 151, at 15.  
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the Fourth Amendment applies to remote intrusions of a cell phone, such 
as the collection of metadata.”200 In Riley, the Court “gingerly skirted the 
legal morass” posed by metadata.201 It is unclear how Riley’s concerns 
for privacy can be reconciled with the Court’s trespass theory from 
Jones, and it thus remains uncertain whether expectations of privacy 
diminish when the government remotely tracks information.
202
 
Justice Sotomayor touched on metadata in her aforementioned Jones 
concurrence,
203
 noting that long-term location monitoring can 
reconstruct someone’s specific movements precisely, resulting in a level 
of information that police would typically need a warrant to obtain: 
“GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a 
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her 
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”204 
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence indicates that she is inclined to require 
law enforcement to show at least reasonable suspicion before tracking 
CSLI.
205
 Nevertheless, the Court found the vast personal information 
available in a cell phone seized incident to arrest to be distinguishable 
from metadata: location does not provide information about a user’s 
applications, photos, or web browsing history. Until the Court addresses 
the issue, we must look to lower courts and legislatures to find a balance 
between law enforcement and privacy interests. 
c. How the Circuit Courts Have Treated CSLI 
The enhanced protections Riley afforded cell phone contents have not 
translated to protections for CSLI in the lower courts. The Fourth, Fifth, 
                                                     
200. Adam Lamparello & Charles E. MacLean, Riley v. California: Privacy Still Matters, But 
How Much and in What Contexts?, 27 REGENT U. L. REV. 25, 28 (2014).  
201. Fourth Amendment—Search and Seizure, supra note 187, at 253 n.31.  
202. Lamparello & MacLean, supra note 200, at 36.  
203. See supra section II.B.2.  
204. Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (citing United States v. Jones, 
__ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).  
205. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (establishing the reasonable suspicion 
standard, which requires law enforcement “to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken 
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion”). Several 
scholars indicate that reasonable suspicion is sufficient for the government to gather metadata. See 
Adam Lamparello & Charles MacLean, Riley v. California: The New Katz or Chimel?, 21 RICH. J. 
L. & TECH. 1, 23 (2014); Lamparello & MacLean, supra note 200, at 27 (asserting that government 
monitoring of calls or location is only acceptable if government has “good reason . . . often referred 
to as probable cause or reasonable suspicion”). 
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Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits do not require a warrant for CSLI, finding 
that it falls under the third-party doctrine.
206
 
In United States v. Davis, the Eleventh Circuit held that law 
enforcement may obtain historical cell site location information without 
a search warrant, because: 
Cell tower location records do not contain private 
communications of the subscriber. This type of non-content 
evidence, lawfully created by a third party telephone company 
for legitimate business purposes, does not belong to [defendant], 
even if it concerns him . . . . [m]ore importantly, like the bank 
customer in Miller and the phone customer in Smith, Davis has 
no subjective or objective reasonable expectation of privacy[.]
207
 
After a two-month string of robberies leading to Davis’s arrest, 
prosecutors obtained a court order under the SCA for his cell location 
records during the relevant period.
208
 The prosecution introduced these 
location records at trial, which only tracked Davis to the nearest mile at 
any given time yet still linked Davis to six of the seven armed robberies 
for which he stood trial.
209
 Davis appealed his conviction, arguing that a 
warrant should have been required for the cell location records.
210
 
The Eleventh Circuit’s three-judge panel found that the government’s 
warrantless gathering of CSLI violated Davis’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.
211
 The en banc panel 
disagreed, holding that Davis’s phone records were indeed third party 
records for which no warrant was required.
212
 
The court distinguished Davis from Jones and Katz.
213
 Unlike in 
Jones, in Davis the government neither used a GPS device nor 
physically trespassed.
214
 Unlike in Katz, where the government recorded 
conversations without a warrant, in Davis the government did not record 
any conversations.
215
 Furthermore, Davis did not fulfill the Katz test: 
                                                     
206. United States v. Graham, Nos. 12-4659, 12-4825, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797 (4th Cir. 
May 31, 2016); United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 883 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. 
Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 500 (11th Cir. 2015); In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell 
Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013).  
207. Davis, 785 F.3d at 528–29.  
208. Id. at 502.  
209. Id. at 503–04.  
210. Id. at 504–05.  
211. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1217 (11th Cir. 2014).  
212. Davis, 785 F.3d at 518. 
213. Id. at 505.  
214. Id.  
215. Id. at 507 (citing United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 354–56 (1967)).  
14 - Danelo.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/4/2016  5:13 PM 
2016] LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO STINGRAY USE 1379 
 
Davis had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his phone records 
since cell phone users are aware that phone companies track their 
locations.
216
 Addressing Riley, the Eleventh Circuit found that cell phone 
location information is categorically different from the cell phone 
contents at question in Riley.
217
 Additionally, the Davis court notes that 
the Riley court “made a special point of stressing that the facts before it 
‘do not implicate the question whether the collection or inspection of 
aggregated digital information amounts to a search under other 
circumstances’”—i.e. that Riley did not address the mosaic theory.218 
The Eleventh Circuit found that changing technology should not be 
afforded any special considerations under the third-party doctrine: 
If our expectation of privacy in our personal communications 
has not changed from what it was when we only wrote letters to 
what it is now that we use telephones to conduct our personal 
interactions, it has not changed just because we now happen to 
use email to personally communicate.
219
 
The court did not require a warrant for Davis’s CSLI, finding that 
Davis’s phone records fell under the third-party doctrine.220 Although a 
circuit split existed at the time, the United States Supreme Court denied 
certiorari to Davis.
221
 
The Fourth Circuit tracks the Eleventh: as in Davis, in Graham the 
three-judge panel ruled that a warrant was required for CSLI, but the en 
banc court overturned that decision.
222
 The panel in Graham relied on 
the mosaic theory to find that, although a single CSLI data point does 
not constitute a search, a large number of data points (here, 221 days’ 
worth) does.
223
 This opinion created a circuit split between the Fifth, 
Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits (holding no warrant required for CSLI) and 
the Fourth Circuit (holding until recently that a warrant was required for 
                                                     
216. Id. at 511. (“[C]ell users know that they must transmit signals to cell towers within range, 
that the cell tower functions as the equipment that connects the calls, that users when making or 
receiving calls are necessarily conveying or exposing to their service provider their general location 
within that cell tower’s range, and that cell phone companies make records of cell-tower usage.”). 
217. Id. at 516 n.19. 
218. Id. (citing Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014)). The Eleventh Circuit 
additionally noted that “[i]t is not helpful to lump together doctrinally unrelated cases that happen to 
involve similar modern technology.” Id. 
219. Id. at 528–29.  
220. Id. 
221. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015). 
222. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015), rev’d en banc, United States v. 
Graham, Nos. 12-4659, 12-4825, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797 (4th Cir. May 31, 2016).  
223. Graham, 796 F.3d at 347–349. 
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CSLI).
224
 But the Graham en banc panel found that CSLI falls under the 
third-party doctrine and held that no warrant was required since law 
enforcement had obtained a court order under the SCA.
225
 The en banc 
decision noted, however, that the United States Supreme Court may 
overrule the third-party doctrine, as discussed in Section II.A.
226
 
The Fifth Circuit similarly found that a court order under the SCA 
was adequate for CSLI.
227
 The Fifth Circuit held that “orders to obtain 
historical cell site information for specified cell phones at the points at 
which the user places and terminates a call are not categorically 
unconstitutional.”228 It also found that historical CSLI is not subject to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy because users knowingly expose this 
information to cell providers.
229
 
Citing Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones, the Fifth Circuit noted 
that “[a] legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public 
attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety 
in a comprehensive way.”230 The court additionally noted that “Congress 
has crafted such a legislative solution in the SCA,” and that the SCA 
“conforms to existing Supreme Court Fourth Amendment 
precedent.”231 Thus, the court “decline[d] to create a new rule to 
hold that Congress’s balancing of privacy and safety is 
unconstitutional.”232 
The Sixth Circuit has ruled that real-time tracking using GPS data 
from a suspect’s cell phone does not implicate the Fourth Amendment 
when the tracking lasts only a few days—a question left open by 
Jones.
233
 The Skinner court found that police use of CSLI to track a 
                                                     
224. C.f. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir. 2016); Graham, 796 F.3d at 
347–49; Davis, 785 F.3d at 511–13; In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 
600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013). 
225. See generally Graham, 796 F.3d 332, rev’d en banc, United States v. Graham, Nos. 12-
4659, 12-4825, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797 (4th Cir. May 31, 2016).  
226. Id., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797, at *5–6. 
227. Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 611–15. 
228. Id. at 615 (emphasis omitted).  
229. Id. at 613, 615 (noting that users likely do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
their cell location information). See also United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 360–61 (5th Cir. 
2014) (noting that the academic debate created post-Riley does not affect lower court precedent, 
under which CSLI still falls under the third party doctrine). 
230. Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 614 (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 
964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)). 
231. Id.  
232. Id. at 615.  
233. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012). 
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defendant’s movements along public highways did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment because individuals have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their public movements.
234
 Furthermore, the court compared a 
cell phone that has tracking capabilities to the location beeper that law 
enforcement planted in a barrel of ether in Karo—in both cases, 
defendants obtained the object with a tracking device already present.
235
 
Because the defendant voluntarily purchased a phone with tracking, he 
eroded his own reasonable expectation of privacy; thus, the police could 
use those tracking capabilities to track him along public roads.
236
 
Unlike the topic of CSLI use, there are few cases involving use of 
StingRays.
237
 Although there was speculation that the United States 
Supreme Court would grant certiorari to the Davis case in order to 
follow Riley with a decision on metadata, the Court denied certiorari—as 
in Jones, sidestepping the issue.
238
 Both courts and privacy advocates 
assert that technology has ushered civil liberties into the virtual world, 
and the law must adapt by “providing legal protections to individuals 
who speak, associate, and assemble in that world.”239 Since existing 
jurisprudence leaves that question open, and a circuit split no longer 
exists to increase the likelihood of United States Supreme Court review, 
this Note seeks to show how to afford adequate legal protections to 
individuals in the absence of United States Supreme Court action. 
                                                     
234. Id. at 778.  
235. Id. at 781 (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)).  
236. Id. at 777.  
237. Another relevant decision notable only for the confusion it lends is the Third Circuit’s 
opinion concluding that historical location information generally may be obtained without a search 
warrant but that a court could require a warrant under some circumstances. See In re United States 
for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commc’n. Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 
304 (3d Cir. 2010). 
238. Mary-Elizabeth M. Hadley, A Circuit Split Emerges: At Least for Now, the Protection 
Afforded to Cell Location Information Depends on Where You Are, CAVEAT VENDOR BLOG (Aug. 
10, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f9fa2829-d608-474e-a525-085b1cceb74c 
[https://perma.cc/29C7-3XP7]; Editor’s Blog, Circuit Split: Eleventh Circuit Creates Division on 
Standard to Obtain Cell Site Location Information, FED. EVID. REV. (June 19, 2014), 
http://federalevidence.com/blog/2014/june/circuit-split-eleventh-circuit-creates-division-standard-
obtain-cell-site-location-in [https://perma.cc/4FVD-N8JP].  
239. Lamparello & MacLean, supra note 208, at 20.  
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III. LEGISLATIVE SUPPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL 
STANDARDS 
Following the Court’s decisions establishing the third-party 
doctrine,
240
 Congress enacted federal legislation that goes above the 
constitutional baseline in protecting communications.
241
 Title III, the 
SCA, and the Pen/Trap statute are examples of when Congress has 
stepped in to supplement the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
These federal statutes prescribe protections for various technology-
related searches. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968 regulates wiretapping and eavesdropping;
242
 the SCA 
regulates the search and interception of electronic communications;
243
 
and the Pen/Trap Statute regulates the use of pen registers to capture 
numbers dialed from a telephone.
244
 
Title III, enacted in the wake of the Court’s decisions in Katz and 
Berger, regulates nonconsensual interception of oral, wire, or electronic 
communications.
245
 Most states have enacted additional statutes 
subsequent to Title III.
246
 Title III was written to provide uniform rules 
for law enforcement engaging in wiretapping or eavesdropping, to 
comply with United States Supreme Court precedent, and to protect the 
privacy of communications.
247
 It includes procedural and substantive 
safeguards that surpass constitutional requirements.
248
 In addition, Title 
III requires that law enforcement have not only probable cause to obtain 
a wiretap, but also particularization of the person and place to be 
wiretapped, as well as limitations on time and types of conversations to 
be seized.
249
 
The SCA regulates government access to the contents of electronic 
communications held by third parties, such as phone companies and 
internet service providers.
250
 It is one of the primary mechanisms 
                                                     
240. See supra Part II.A. 
241. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012); §§ 2701–2712; §§ 3121–3127.   
242. §§ 2510–2522.  
243. §§ 2701–2712. 
244. §§ 3121–3127. 
245. See §§ 2510–22.  
246. RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
901 (Wolters Kluwer, 2d ed. 2011).  
247. Id. at 901–02.  
248. Id.  
249. Id.  
250. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012). 
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currently regulating CSLI.
251
 The SCA criminalizes unauthorized access 
to users’ stored communications,252 restricts providers from sharing 
those communications,
253
 and regulates the government’s requests for 
data governed by the SCA.
254
 For non-content information, such as a 
user’s account details, address, or credit card number, only a subpoena is 
required.
255
 For transactional records, such as a list of addresses to which 
an individual has sent emails or phone numbers an individual has called, 
the SCA requires a court order showing “reasonable grounds to believe 
that the . . . information sought [is] relevant and material to an ongoing 
criminal investigation.”256 This court order is an intermediate evidentiary 
standard: lower than the probable cause requirement of a warrant, but 
higher than a subpoena.
257
 Many courts have ruled CSLI accessible with 
a court order under the SCA.
258
 Courts that allow historical CSLI access 
under the SCA treat CSLI as a transactional record and require only a 
court order.
259
 
The Pen/Trap statute,
260
 like the SCA, provides “that law enforcement 
agencies may record and store indefinitely all of the digits dialed from a 
specific telephone without a warrant, without notification to the user, 
and without a showing of probable cause.”261 The Pen/Trap Statute 
regulates law enforcement’s use of pen registers (which record the phone 
numbers a telephone user dials) and trap-and-trace devices (which 
perform the opposite function, recording the digits of all incoming calls 
to a given telephone).
262
 Though pen registers were once used only for 
telephone communications, they are now used for a variety of electronic 
media.
263
 
                                                     
251. Ross, supra note 32, at 1197.  
252. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012). 
253. 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012). 
254. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012). 
255. Id. 
256. Id. 
257. S. REP. NO. 103-402, at 31 (1994).  
258. Fraser, supra note 33, at 585.  
259. Ross, supra note 32, at 1199.   
260. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (2012). 
261. Marcus M. Baldwin, Note, Dirty Digits: The Collection of Post-Cut-Through Dialed Digits 
Under the Pen/Trap Statute, 74 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1109, 1109 (2009).  
262. Id. at 1109 n.3; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (2012) (collectively the “Pen/Trap Statute”). For 
the statutory definition of a pen register, see § 3127(3).  
263. Baldwin, supra note 261, at 1109.  
14 - Danelo.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/4/2016  5:13 PM 
1384 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:1355 
 
In the case of cell phones, pen registers can calculate a user’s physical 
location or track their movements in real time.
264
 Courts have approved 
court orders under the Pen/Trap Statute for technology that eavesdrops 
on actual phone conversations as well as for technology that monitors 
URLs that a suspect visited and addresses he emailed.
265
 This shows that 
the classification of a device as a pen register is “primarily functional”—
use of the statute is not inextricably linked to the use of an actual pen 
register.
266
 But the pen register statute itself mandates that information 
gathered “shall not include the contents of any communication . . . .”267 
Indeed, courts have found that actual pen registers pose a lesser threat to 
privacy than traditional wiretaps because pen registers cannot reveal the 
contents of a communication.
268
 This follows the holding in Smith v. 
Maryland that Fourth Amendment protections do not apply to dialed 
digits.
269
 For these reasons, the government has relied on Smith to 
support CSLI collection.
270
 
Title III, the SCA, and the Pen/Trap statute show that when Congress 
has intervened to provide greater privacy for communications above the 
constitutional baseline, it still has not required a warrant for non-content 
communication. Instead, Congress requires court orders or subpoenas. 
IV. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS FOR CSLI AND STINGRAY USE 
Given that law enforcement’s use of CSLI is a controversial and 
pressing issue, what should be done about its use? As noted above, the 
United States Supreme Court has refrained from addressing the issue of 
metadata,
271
 and the Court recently denied certiorari in a case that would 
have resolved the issue of whether warrants are required for CSLI.
272
 
                                                     
264. Id. at 1113.  
265. People v. Kramer, 706 N.E.2d 731, 737 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that if a device’s digital and 
audio functions were “sufficiently discrete” and there was only a remote likelihood of misuse, the 
presence of audio-capable technology would not disqualify a device from use as a pen register); 
United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 504, 510 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a Pen/Trap court 
order allowed law enforcement to obtain defendant’s URLs visited and addresses emailed).  
266. Baldwin, supra note 261, at 1114.  
267. 18 U.S.C. §3127(3). See also § 3121(c), also requiring that no communication contents be 
captured.  
268. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 165–68 (1977).  
269. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); see also Smith v. State, 389 A.2d 858, 868 (Md. 
1978) (state court of last resort holding).  
270. Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional 
Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 757, 866–67, 871 (2014). 
271. See supra Part II.B.2.ii. 
272. See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc).  
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This may indicate that the Court is not ready to address the metadata 
issue. Until the Court does, there is no clear rule for how location 
information is protected. 
In the absence of Court action, a legislative solution is appropriate. In 
Riley, Justice Alito made a strong suggestion for legislation in his 
concurrence, stating he “would reconsider the question presented here if 
either Congress or state legislatures . . . enact legislation that draws 
reasonable distinctions . . . .”273 Some courts point out that establishing 
“bright-line rules regarding legal protection for . . . CSLI is a task for the 
legislature, which is better suited to striking a delicate balance between 
the needs of law enforcement and the civil liberties of American 
citizens.”274 
The legislature is better suited than the courts to solve this issue 
because it is not bound by its own precedent; it can better assess facts; 
and it can act quickly to reflect the changes and expansions in 
technology.
275
 It is better to formulate privacy law by legislation 
because, unlike the courts, legislatures can pass sweeping but intricate 
laws.
276
 While courts are limited to developing rules based on the cases 
that come to them, legislatures can tailor laws to a wide range of 
circumstances and are not bound by stare decisis.
277
 Courts adjudicate 
past disputes, which means that judicial holdings on issues of technology 
or other fast-changing subjects tend to be “outdated on arrival,” whereas 
legislatures can simultaneously address both present and future 
concerns.
278
 
Historically, congressional action is unlikely: multiple efforts to 
regulate CSLI have stalled.
279
 In 2012 a bipartisan group of Senators 
proposed a bill regulating CSLI.
280
 In 2015, the group reformulated the 
                                                     
273. Riley v. California, __ U.S. __ 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring). 
274. Ross, supra note 32, at 1212, citing In re United States for an Order Authorizing the Release 
of Historical Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 585 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
275. Orin Kerr, Governor Brown Vetoes Bill on Searching Cell Phones Incident to Arrest, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 10, 2011, 2:39 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2011/10/10/governor-
brown-vetoes-bill-on-searching-cell-phones-incident-to-arrest/ [https://perma.cc/7LBF-NMHL]. 
276. See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional 
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805 (2004).  
277. Schlabach, supra note 133, at 699.  
278. Id. 
279. See Elliott, supra note 151, at 3; Robinson Meyer, Do Police Need a Warrant to See Where 
a Phone Is?, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/ 
2015/08/warrantless-cell-phone-location-tracking/400775/ [https://perma.cc/3LT4-LUSR] (“[A] 
bipartisan bill about CSLI has lingered in [Congress’] higher chamber for years”).   
280. Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S. 3414, 112th Cong. (2012) (amendment proposed by Wyden), 
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/?id=081B52AA-0F9B-4B5E-88C2-911CF39E6D86 
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bill as the Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance Act, which would 
require law enforcement to obtain a warrant before acquiring an 
individual’s geolocation information.281 Despite these efforts, there is an 
intractable debate between privacy advocates and law enforcement over 
appropriate legislative reform, which continuously prevents federal 
legislation regulating CSLI from passing.
282
 Thus, the prospect of 
congressional action is far from certain. 
Since Congress is either unwilling or unable to pass an appropriate 
legislative solution, state legislatures should step in. Not only are states 
more nimble in addressing the technology questions that paralyze 
Congress, they also accommodate differing local tastes for the balance 
between privacy and effective law enforcement.
283
 
Furthermore, state legislation is necessary to regulate police policy at 
the local level. According to data maintained by the ACLU, there is no 
clear consensus among states about how to treat CSLI.
284
 Even 
individual states have yet to determine statewide StingRay policies: for 
example, in Washington State, the Seattle Police Department does not 
use StingRays, but the nearby Tacoma Police Department does.
285
 
Federally, the Justice Department and the IRS have recently begun to 
require warrants.
286
 In the absence of Congressional action, state 
                                                     
&download=1 [https://perma.cc/4WBJ-YMCZ]; see also Ron Wyden, Amendments Offered to the 
Cybersecurity Act of 2012 (July 30, 2012), https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/blog/post/ 
cybersecurity-act-of-2012 [https://perma.cc/GUP5-BYQN].  
281.  Geological Privacy and Surveillance Act (GPS Act), S. 237, 114th Cong. (2015), 
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/priorities/gps-act [https://perma.cc/BSK7-6VAZ]. 
282. Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward Reasonable 
Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data That Congress Could Enact, 27 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 123–24 (2012). 
283. See, e.g., Schlabach, supra note 133, at 699. 
284. The status of the law is as follows: no warrant requirement in fourteen states, location 
information is unprotected in nineteen states and the District of Columbia, “some protections” in 
three states (indicating that “judges have discretion to require warrant for historical CSLI”), and a 
warrant required for all cell phone location information in six states. Robinson Meyer, Where 
Americans Can Be Tracked Without a Warrant, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 12, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/11/where-americans-can-be-tracked-without-
a-warrant/415461/ [https://perma.cc/K3U8-FR6B]. 
285. Ansel Herz, Seattle Police Deny Having or Using “Stingray” Data Sucking Device, THE 
STRANGER (Aug. 28, 2014, 1:22 PM), http://slog.thestranger.com/slog/archives/2014/08/28/seattle-
police-deny-having-or-using-StingRay-cell-phone-data-sucking-device [https://perma.cc/84PK-
YR9X]; Martin, supra note 3.  
286. Nicholas Fandos, Justice Dept. to Require Warrants for Some Cellphone Tracking, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/us/politics/justice-dept-to-require-
warrants-for-some-cellphone-tracking.html [https://perma.cc/VW87-EMES]; Ron Wyden, IRS 
Commits to Follow Justice Department Guidelines on StingRays in Letter to Wyden (Dec. 1, 2015), 
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legislatures can ensure a clear standard at the local level.
287
 Some states, 
including Washington, have stepped up to the challenge.
288
 
This Note details three separate approaches for potential legislation. 
The options are as follows: require no warrant or other judicial approval, 
require a court order based on reasonable suspicion, or, the most 
protective, require a warrant based on probable cause. 
A. Require No Warrant 
As of 2015, seventeen states had not passed legislation that required 
any showing of suspicion, through either a court order or a warrant, for 
StingRays.
289
 Without legislation, Americans are limited to the 
minimum constitutional protection. The circuit courts that have 
addressed this issue require no warrant for CSLI collection: under their 
interpretation, CSLI is information voluntarily conveyed to a third 
party.
290
 These courts find that CSLI falls under the third-party doctrine 
and therefore is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection.
291
 Beyond 
                                                     
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/irs-commits-to-follow-justice-department-
guidelines-on-StingRays-in-letter-to-wyden [https://perma.cc/TND7-ZWD5].  
287. Larry Greenemeier, What Is the Big Secret Surrounding StingRay Surveillance? SCI. 
AMERICAN (June 25, 2015), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-is-the-big-secret-
surrounding-StingRay-surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/856A-9LSS] (“You’re dealing with outdated 
statutes concerning new and very different technology. It’s possible in five years maybe that 
Congress will step in and do something. More likely, state legislatures will take most of the action 
to monitor this type of surveillance. Washington State, California [and others] have already acted, 
and Texas is evaluating the standards for approving StingRay use.”).  
288. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.260 (West 2015). 
289. Status of Location Privacy Legislation in the States: 2015, ACLU (Aug. 26, 2015), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/status-location-privacy-legislation-states-2015 
[https://perma.cc/5VB4-QHVV] (discussing relevant legislation in Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi, 
Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin. Currently these states are at a 
constitutional minimum, but may soon legislate to provide enhanced constitutional protections, as 
this is a quickly changing area of law.).  
290. United States v. Graham, Nos. 12-4659, 12-4825, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797, at *13 (4th 
Cir. May 31, 2016) (en banc); United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir. 2016); United 
States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511–13 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc); In re Application of U.S. for 
Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013). 
291. See Graham, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797, at *4 (noting that “[a]ll of our sister circuits to 
have considered the question have held, as we do today, that the government does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment when it obtains historical CSLI from a service provider without a warrant 
[under the third party doctrine].”). 
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these circuit court decisions, additional law enforcement departments 
currently rely on the third-party doctrine to gather warrantless CSLI.
292
 
The third-party doctrine applies to CSLI under the theory that the cell 
phone user voluntarily conveys a phone’s location information to the cell 
provider.
293
 Cell phone users understand that, for billing and general use 
purposes, they must convey their location information to the provider.
294
 
This awareness is reflected not only by cell phone bills but also by 
common knowledge. Under this interpretation, CSLI is not subject to 
constitutional protection. 
Proponents of this position argue that cell phone users are readily 
aware that their CSLI information is available to others.
295
 According to 
the Pew Research Center, more than half of “app” users have uninstalled 
or decided not to install an app due to concerns about their personal 
information being shared.
296
 Additionally, one in five cell phone owners 
have turned off the location tracking feature on their phone, and one in 
three have cleared their cell phone browsing or search history.
297
 These 
actions indicate that cell phone users know that the government may 
collect their information and that they can take steps to protect that 
information.
298
 It is under this rationale that the circuit courts found no 
subjective or objective expectation of privacy in CSLI.
299
 
Conversely, the third-party doctrine may not apply to StingRays. 
StingRays may not comply with Karo’s enhanced privacy afforded to 
the home: “‘[n]o matter how the StingRay is used—to identify, locate or 
intercept—they always send signals through the walls of homes,’ which 
should trigger a warrant requirement” since the signals “penetrate a 
                                                     
292. See, e.g., Mathew Keys, California Cops Used Stingrays 300 Times Without Warrant, THE 
BLOT (May 28, 2015), https://www.theblot.com/report-california-cops-used-stingrays-300-times-
without-warrant-2-7744246 [https://perma.cc/R4LK-A7BG].  
293. Kyle Malone, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and the Stored Communications Act: Why 
the Warrantless Gathering of Historical Cell Site Location Information Poses No Threat to Privacy, 
39 PEPP. L. REV. 701, 739 (2012).  
294. Id.  
295. Graham, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797, at *10–12. 
296. Pew Research Center, supra note 15.  
297. Id.  
298. See The Problem with Mobile Phones, SURVEILLANCE SELF-DEFENSE, 
https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/problem-mobile-phones [https://perma.cc/2CUQ-Y99Z] (describing 
mobile phone privacy and how to get more of it).  
299. Graham, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797 at *13; United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 
(6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511–13 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc); In re 
Application of United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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space protected by the Fourth Amendment.”300 Under this theory, Karo 
precludes the third party analysis, since the government cannot use 
technology to access information about the inside of a person’s home 
without obtaining a warrant.
301
 
B. Require a Court Order Based on Reasonable Suspicion 
While the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits did not require a 
warrant for CSLI, the officers in all cases had obtained court orders to 
gather CSLI pursuant to the SCA.
302
 A court order requirement is the 
middle ground between no warrant and a full warrant, since individuals 
have already “exposed” their CSLI information by using a cell phone, 
reducing their expectation of privacy therein.
303
 
Requiring a court order based on reasonable suspicion is the moderate 
approach, but no state legislature has adopted it yet.
304
 The rationale 
supporting a court order standard tracks Congress’ intent in adopting the 
SCA.
305
 With the SCA, Congress sought a “fair balance between the 
privacy expectations of American citizens and the legitimate needs of 
law enforcement agencies.”306 The SCA, which requires a court order to 
access electronic non-content data,
307
 was written to protect privacy lest 
it “gradually erode as technology advances.”308 
Search warrants require probable cause, but under typical definitions, 
subpoenas and court orders do not.
309
 A court order generally requires 
specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds 
to believe that the records or other information sought is relevant and 
material to an ongoing criminal investigation.
310
 Reasonable suspicion 
                                                     
300. Ellen Nakashima, Little-Known Surveillance Tool Raises Concerns by Judges, Privacy 
Activists, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/little-known-surveillance-tool-raises-concerns-by-judges-privacy-
activists/2013/03/27/8b60e906-9712-11e2-97cd-3d8c1afe4f0f_story.html [https://perma.cc/9F6R-
7JE9] (quoting Chris Soghoian).  
301. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984).  
302. Graham, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797 at *13; Davis, 785 F.3d at 511–13; Carpenter, 819 
F.3d at 886; Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 615. 
303. Graham, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797 at *12; see also id.at *16–22. 
304. ACLU, supra note 289.  
305. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3358. 
306. Id.  
307. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).  
308. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5.  
309. Fishman, supra note 58, at 1010.   
310. 18 U.S.C. §2703(d) (2002).  
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means that the police, acting under a reasonable person standard, have 
specific and articulable facts connecting a suspect to criminal activity. In 
contrast, a warrant requires probable cause, meaning a reasonable person 
under the circumstances would believe that a crime either had been or 
was about to be committed.
311
 
Thus the reasonable suspicion required by a court order is an 
intermediate standard, below probable cause but above the mere 
relevance standard required for federal use of a pen register or trap-and-
trace device.
312
 Professor Orin Kerr, a scholar well-versed in these 
issues, approves of a reasonable suspicion standard even for content 
data, which has traditionally received more protection than metadata.
313
 
C. Require a Warrant Based on Probable Cause 
Requiring a warrant based on probable cause was, until recently, an 
uncommon solution.
314
 A warrant based on probable cause ensures 
heightened privacy protections for CSLI.
315
 Under this approach, law 
enforcement would fill out a standard form describing the nature of the 
search, the place to be searched, and the items to be “seized” (here, 
location information).
316
 The requesting officer would need to detail the 
probable cause linking the items to be seized with a particular endeavor 
and the specified location.
317
 
Advocates for a full warrant requirement argue that tracking CSLI 
enables the government to track a defendant across public and private 
spaces and discover some of the private activities and personal habits of 
the user.
318
 Under this analysis, cell phone users have a reasonable 
                                                     
311. See supra text accompanying note 39.  
312. In re United States for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commc’n. Serv. to Disclose 
Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). 
313. 18 U.S.C. §2703(d) (2012); Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, 
and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1234–35 (2004); see also 
discussion of Fourth Amendment protections of content data, supra Part III. 
314. Kim Zetter, New Bill Would Force Cops to Get Stingray Warrants, WIRED MAG. (Nov. 3, 
2015, 3:27 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/11/new-bill-would-force-cops-to-get-warrants-before 
-spying-with-stingrays/ [https://perma.cc/EW88-E4PB] (noting widespread use of Stingrays without 
a warrant, and the new warrant requirement).  
315. The Fourth Amendment requires that warrants be issued based on probable cause. U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV. 
316. Andrew D. Huynh, Note, What Comes After “Get a Warrant”: Balancing Particularity and 
Practicality in Mobile Device Search Warrants Post-Riley, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 187, 197 (2015). 
317. Id.  
318. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 345 (4th Cir. 2015).  
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expectation of privacy in their aggregate location information, so a 
warrant based on probable cause should be required.
319
 
A full warrant has traditionally been required for content searches of 
homes and even of cell phones.
320
 Location information, however, is not 
content data; it merely discloses where an individual is at a given time, 
providing much less information about a person than the contents of 
their home or the contents of communications on their phone. Even 
those advocating for a general warrant requirement for CSLI note that 
serious crimes, such as terrorism and kidnappings, should be exceptions 
to a general warrant requirement for CSLI.
321
 Yet the United States 
Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to differentiate between the 
seriousness of different crimes in determining when probable cause is 
required.
322
 A full warrant requirement could therefore be an undue 
burden on law enforcement, as it would require the highest level of 
privacy protection at an early stage of the investigation—when officers 
are unlikely to have enough evidence to obtain a warrant. 
D. Examples of Enacted Legislation 
Washington, California, Virginia, Minnesota, Utah, and the 
Department of Justice have adopted statutes and policies regulating law 
enforcement’s use of cell site simulators.323 The DOJ policy requires law 
enforcement to include all of the information required under a federal 
pen register order
324
 when applying to use a cell site simulator.
325
 The 
                                                     
319. Id. 
320. Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (unless an exception to the warrant 
requirement applies). 
321. Elliott, supra note 151, at 15. 
322. ALLEN, supra note 246, at 432–35; Jeff Welty, Probable Cause: The Same for All Crimes?, 
N.C. CRIM. L. (June 28, 2011), http://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/probable-cause-the-same-for-all-
crimes/ [https://perma.cc/WS2R-2M3N].  
323. See CAL. GOV’T CODE. § 53166 (West 2016); MINN. STAT. § 626A.42 (West 2014); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 77-23c-102 (West 2016); VA. CODE ANN. 19.2-70.3 (West 2016); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 9.73.260 (West 2015); Matthew McCoy, New StingRay Policies for Both Washington State and 
the Department of Justice, WASH. J.L., TECH. & ARTS BLOG (Oct. 14, 2015), 
https://wjlta.wordpress.com/2015/10/14/new-StingRay-policies-for-both-washington-state-and-the-
department-of-justice/ [https://perma.cc/AHK8-K9SC]. See also  HB 1408, 2015 Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Va. 2015), https://www.richmondsunlight.com/bill/2015/hb1408/ [https://perma.cc/ 
W4N8-44NG]; Sub. HB 5640, 2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ct. 2016),  https://www.cga.ct.gov/ 
2016/ACT/pa/2016PA-00148-R00HB-05640-PA.htm [https://perma.cc/PGX4-LJXG]; SB 178, 
2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2015),   https://leginfo. legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml? 
bill_id=201520160SB178 [https://perma.cc/4NYD-9H97].  
324. 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (2012). 
325. McCoy, supra note 323. 
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DOJ’s policy also “follows Washington’s lead” on data retention and 
deletion, requiring the application to detail how the data will be collected 
and that it will be disposed of within 30 days.
326
 
Washington’s efforts in this area are of note because Washington has 
historically been more protective of privacy than other jurisdictions.
327
 
After the United States Supreme Court held that individuals had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of garbage left on their 
curb for collection,
328
 the Washington State Supreme Court granted 
greater protections, holding that an officer’s search of a suspect’s trash 
required a warrant.
329
 The Washington Constitution surpasses the 
protections against unreasonable search and seizure afforded by the 
Fourth Amendment.
330
 Article I section 7, which provides that “[n]o 
person shall be disturbed in his [or her] private affairs, or his home 
invaded, without authority of law,” protects people from warrantless 
searches.
331
 The Washington legislature’s solution to CSLI and StingRay 
use is based in enhanced privacy protections, and has been lauded by 
privacy advocates.
332
 
1. Details of the Washington Statute 
The Washington legislation requires a court order for StingRays 
under the pen register statute, based on probable cause.
333
 The 
Washington statute is “one of the most aggressive anti-tracking 
measures in the nation.”334 Washington’s heightened concerns and 
protections of privacy surpass that of the majority of states, which have 
not imposed privacy requirements beyond those required by the Fourth 
                                                     
326. Id.  
327. State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 577–78, 800 P.2d 1112, 1115 (1990) (discussing 
historical protections that the Washington State Supreme Court has imposed under article 1, section 
7 of the Washington State Constitution, beyond those provided by the Fourth Amendment). 
328. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43–45 (1988).  
329. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d at 57880, 800 P.2d at 111617. 
330. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
331. Id.  
332. Cyrus Farivar, Cops Must Now Get a Warrant to Use Stingrays in Washington State, ARS 
TECHNICA (May 12, 2015, 6:49 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/05/cops-must-now-
get-a-warrant-to-use-stingrays-in-washington-state/ [https://perma.cc/HPV9-HJZR].  
333. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.260 (West 2015). 
334. Russell Brandom, Washington State Will Require a Warrant for Stingray Cell-Phone 
Tracking, THE VERGE (May 12, 2015), http://www.theverge.com/2015/5/12/8591491/StingRay-
cell-phone-trackers-washington-state-law-tacoma [https://perma.cc/SY5J-RASC]. 
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Amendment.
335
 Indeed, the ACLU has lauded Washington’s leadership 
in regulating StingRays.
336
 
The amendment expands Chapter 9.73 of the Revised Code of 
Washington to require either informed consent or a warrant based on 
probable cause for general collection of a person’s electronic data or 
metadata.
337
 The regulations applicable to pen registers and trap-and-
trace devices now extend to regulate cell site simulators: law 
enforcement must obtain a warrant to install and use a cell site simulator, 
unless there is “probable cause to believe an emergency exists.”338 
When applying for a warrant to use a StingRay, law enforcement 
must provide an extensive list of precise information to the issuing 
judge.
339
 This information includes: (A) the telephone or account 
number the officers or agents are trying to trace; (B) the physical 
location of the device sought (if known); (C) the type of device the 
officers or agents are trying to trace; (D) the geographic area where the 
StingRay will be used; (E) all categories of metadata, data, or 
information that will be collected; (F) whether or not the device will 
collect that data of third parties; and (G) any disruptions to 
communications that the device may cause.
340
 As further protection, the 
statute requires law enforcement to proactively limit and immediately 
delete any third party data collected.
341
 They must also delete the 
suspect’s metadata within thirty days, unless there is probable cause to 
suggest that the metadata provides evidence of a crime.
342
 
Washington’s requirement that law enforcement explain StingRay 
technology to judges approving use of the devices is in keeping with 
privacy advocates’ admonitions that “if the government wants to use 
invasive surveillance technology like [StingRays], it must explain the 
                                                     
335. See Jack L. Landau, Should State Courts Depart from the Fourth Amendment? Search and 
Seizure, State Constitutions, and the Oregon Experience, 77 MISS. L.J. 369, 373 n.17 (2007). 
336. Washington Becomes a Leader in Restricting Use of Invasive Stingrays, ACLU (May 13, 
2015), https://www.aclu.org/news/washington-becomes-leader-restricting-use-invasive-stingrays 
[https://perma.cc/3L4P-5NCS]. As of the editing of this Note, Virginia, Connecticut, and California 
have followed suit. See supra note 323. 
337. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.260 (West 2015).  
338. S. REP. NO. 1440, 2015 Reg. Sess., (Wa. 2015) http://app.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/ 
2015-16/Htm/Bill%20Reports/Senate/1440-S.E%20SBR%20LAW%2015.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
QX5A-XZFL] (Note that the statute contains an emergency situation exception to the warrant 
requirement). 
339. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.260 (4)(c)(ii) (West 2015). 
340. Id. 
341. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.260 (6)(c) (West 2015). 
342. Id.  
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technology to the courts so they can perform their judicial oversight 
function as required by the Constitution.”343 Understanding the 
technology is “critical to deciding who may possess and use cell site 
simulators, to what extent, and for what purposes.”344 Under the statute, 
the requested warrant must clearly explain the technology to the issuing 
magistrate.
345
 
A statute requiring law enforcement to describe how StingRays work 
is helpful because it reduces the societal costs of secrecy around the 
technology.
346
 The less the public knows about the workings, 
availability, and use of StingRays, the less demand the public creates for 
secured communications.
347
 This accordingly increases individuals’ risk 
of being intercepted.
348
 The FBI’s response to this concern is that over-
disclosure of CSLI technology will enable criminals and terrorists to 
thwart investigations by modifying their behavior.
349
 Yet many agents 
are still using StingRays with a pen register application that does not 
explain the use of the technology, and there are multiple reports of 
judges approving pen register orders without knowing that they are 
actually approving StingRay use.
350
 Leaving judges in the dark as to 
what they are approving could lead to general noncompliance by 
magistrates or burdensome litigation to overturn improperly obtained 
court orders.
351
 
                                                     
343. Linda Lye, In Court: Uncovering Stingrays, A Troubling New Location Tracking Device, 
ACLU BLOG (Oct 22, 2012, 12:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/court-uncovering-stingrays-
troubling-new-location-tracking-device [https://perma.cc/CZ9R-DSLP]. 
344. Hardman, supra note 21, at 28. 
345. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.260 (4)(c)(ii)(C) (West 2015). 
346. See Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Your Secret StingRay’s No Secret Anymore: 
The Vanishing Government Monopoly Over Cell Phone Surveillance and Its Impact on National 
Security and Consumer Privacy, 28 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 6–7 (2014). 
347. Id.  
348. Id.  
349. Affidavit of FBI Supervisory Special Agent Bradley S. Morrison, Chief, Tracking 
Technology Unit, Operation Technology Division in Quantico Division, at 2, Apr. 11, 2014, 
attachment to City’s Verified Answer, Hodai v. City of Tucson, No. C20141225 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. 
Apr. 14, 2014). 
350. See Nakashima, supra note 300; E-mail from Miranda Kane, Chief, Criminal Div., U.S. 
Attorney’s Off. N.D. Cal., to USACAN-Attorneys-Criminal, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (May 23, 2011, 
11:55 AM), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/doj_emails_on_stingray_requests.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/3VUR-TNQH]. 
351. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 3. 
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2. Other State Statutes 
Like Washington, California, Minnesota, Utah, and Virginia require a 
warrant for both historical and real-time CSLI.
352
 The statutes are 
substantially similar, with differences as noted below. 
California requires a high level of public disclosure: in order for an 
agency to acquire a StingRay, the local legislative body must approve 
the acquisition at a public meeting.
353
 Once the agency has acquired the 
device, they must provide conspicuous public notice of the acquisition 
on their department’s website.354 
Minnesota, Utah, and Virginia explicitly list the permissible 
exceptions to the warrant requirement.
355
 Minnesota permits officers to 
obtain location information without a tracking warrant when the device 
is lost or stolen; when the owner has called to request emergency 
services or has given affirmative consent to the search; or in another 
emergency situation involving risk of death or serious physical harm.
356
 
Utah does not require a warrant if the owner has reported the device 
stolen; has consented to the search; has “voluntarily and publicly 
disclosed the location information;” or if there is a judicially recognized 
exception to the warrant requirements, such as exigent circumstances.
357
 
Virginia follows in the same vein, but also allows a user’s legal guardian 
or next of kin to consent to a StingRay search if they believe that the 
user is in personal danger.
358
 
Some states with a warrant requirement allow for a grace period. The 
Washington statute grants a grace period to officers who use a StingRay 
without a warrant: they have forty-eight hours within which to obtain 
court authorization.
359
 If they fail to obtain authorization, the evidence 
gathered is not admissible in a legal proceeding.
360
 Virginia grants a 
longer grace period of three days.
361
 None of the other states grants any 
grace period, requiring officers to either obtain a warrant or lose any 
                                                     
352. CAL. GOV’T CODE. § 53166 (West 2016); MINN. STAT. § 626A.42 (West 2014); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 77-23c-102 (West 2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-70.3 (West 2016); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 9.73.260 (West 2015).  
353. CAL. GOV’T CODE. § 53166(c)(1) (West 2016).  
354. CAL. GOV’T CODE. § 53166(c)(2).  
355. MINN. STAT. § 626A.42; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23c-102; VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-70.3.  
356. MINN. STAT. § 626A.42(b)(1)-(5).  
357. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23c-102(2)(a).  
358. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-70.3(E)(3).  
359. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.260(6)(a) (West 2015).  
360. Id. 
361. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-70.3(E)(4). 
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evidence collected. Once a judge issues a warrant, both Virginia and 
Washington limit the tracking period to thirty days, subject to possible 
extension in additional thirty-day periods.
362
 
While the only penalty provided by Washington for violating the 
statute is a gross misdemeanor charge,
363
 California expressly provides 
for actual damages of no less than $2,500, with potential awards of 
punitive damages and attorney’s fees.364 Utah, while not providing any 
specific penalties, does create a safe harbor for phone companies that 
comply with law enforcement requests.
365
 
These differences are likely a byproduct of the drafting process of 
each statute: while Washington amended its pen register statute to 
include StingRays, other states appear to have written the statutes anew. 
But with the exception of these minor differences, the various statutes all 
provide the same basic requirement of a warrant based upon probable 
cause. 
CONCLUSION 
Regardless of which approach states take, they should pass legislation 
that clarifies law enforcements’ burdens before collecting CSLI. Circuit 
courts’ treatment of CSLI, as well as the United States Supreme Court’s 
silence on the issue, creates a need for clarity at the state level. This Note 
aims to help states determine the proper legislative solution to law 
enforcement’s use of cell site simulators such as StingRays. 
Even if a circuit court has held that CSLI is available under the third-
party doctrine without a court order or a warrant, state legislatures can 
still provide enhanced protections by requiring a court order or a 
warrant. Furthermore, if the United States Supreme Court considers 
CSLI, the Court will look to existing state laws to inform its analysis of 
the issues in question. States’ adoption of clear and simple rules will 
promote long-term stability in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
Whether states require a court order or a warrant, a legislative solution 
would help resolve the current confusion among states and in circuit 
courts. 
 
                                                     
362. VA. CODE. ANN. § 19.2-70.3(J). 
363. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.080 (West 2015). 
364. SB 741, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2015), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/ 
billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB741 [https://perma.cc/4E8S-BLV6].  
365. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23c-102(3) (West 2016).  
